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Abstract: This article argues that analytic philosophy has a 
“convincingness deficit”; that proponents of the analytic method’s 
application to questions of theology must consider whether it is the 
best tool for the purpose at hand; and that phenomenology – in 
particular, Sartrean phenomenology – provides a useful 
methodological complement to the scholarly analysis of faith. After 
defining the convincingness deficit and what I take analytic theology to 
be, I defend phenomenology against the charge of “subjectivity” (voiced 
by Dennett and others) in order to argue that the varied ends of 
theological discourse require varied means – means which include 
phenomenology. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article invites analytic theologians to reconsider the value of phenomenological 
approaches to faith. Given that continental criticisms of the analytic method have 
already been made by Merold Westphal and others much of what I have to say is not 
new. But my argument is distinctive in proposing that Sartrean phenomenology is a 
fruitful methodological resource. As a Christian theologian who teaches analytic 
philosophy of religion, I recognize that this move may seem ironic. But Sartre’s atheist 
philosophy contains many valuable insights. 
 In his chapter of the 2009 volume on analytic theology, Oliver Crisp writes that 
some theologians may view analytic theology as a “Trojan horse” which will smuggle 
“into the citadel of theology potentially destructive alien ideas” (2009, 34). In what 
follows I will argue that it is not so much “alien ideas” that may seem to pose a danger 
to “doing theology sensibly,” as Michael Rea puts it in his introduction to the same 
volume, but the horse itself: the analytic method may be deployed in certain contexts 
with success, but if, as in analytic philosophy of the Christian religion, it has what I 
will call a “convincingness deficit,” theologians need to ask if it is the best tool for the 
purpose at hand.  
I will start by introducing the convincingness deficit. Then I will outline what 
I take to be “analytic theology,” and why I think a Sartrean phenomenological method 
could complement it. It is hoped that, along the way, we will clarify some confusions 
between the ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ approaches. 
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The convincingness deficit 
 
Methodologically, the analytic approach assigns a great deal of weight to inference. 
Where matters of faith are concerned, however, both continental and analytic 
thinkers have questioned the role of inferentiality when it comes to theism. 
Kierkegaard’s “leap of faith” is an obvious example of the former tradition saying that 
reason will only lead to a crossroads, at which point: the leap. In the analytic tradition 
consider, for example, the following three articles in the philosophy of religion: (1) 
Plantinga’s modal ontological argument (1974); (2) William Rowe’s “The Problem of 
Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” (1979); and (3) John Hawthorne’s 2014 paper 
“Evil and Evidence.” The salient feature of these three papers is that, in the 
conclusions of each, they concede limits to the persuasive power of inference. In the 
conclusion of (1), for example, Plantinga writes that he “obviously” hasn’t given a 
“proof”; but rather evidence “that there is nothing contrary to reason or irrational in 
accepting [his argument…] [I]t establishes, not the truth of theism, but its rational 
acceptability. And hence it accomplishes at least one of the aims of the tradition of 
natural theology.” In section III of Rowe’s paper, he asks what position the atheist 
should take with respect to the rationality of theistic belief and defends his “friendly 
atheism,” which grants that theists may be rationally justified in believing the God of 
theism exists, even though their beliefs (on the atheist view) are false. And in 
Hawthorne’s paper he advocates forms of “concessionary” theism he believes the 
theist should seriously consider. The devil, for me, is not in the details of their 
individual arguments, but rather in the common theme, well summarized by John 
Hawthorne’s words, that: “Mere inferentiality doesn’t make it good.”  
 “Mere inferentiality” may be what makes things “good” in cases of formal logic. 
But when the subject matter is God, these analytic philosophers clearly do not expect 
their arguments to persuade others of their conclusions, even when those “others” 
are fellow philosophers. This raises interesting questions about disagreement, but 
what concerns us today is whether the analytic horse is fit for the theological Troy, so 
before going further I will clarify what I take “analytic theology” to be. 
 
 
Analytic theology 
 
First, I take analytic theology to be a descendent of Christian analytic philosophy of 
religion. Lamenting theology’s “continental captivity,” Michael Rea writes that many 
theologians “seem to have very different ideas from analytic philosophers about how 
theology (and philosophy) ought to be done, and about the value of analytic 
approaches to theological topics” (2009, 1). I share his sentiment that the 
methodological divide is a “significant obstacle to fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue” 
(2009, 1–2), and agree that it is “an open and interesting question whether theology 
can sensibly be done in the analytic mode.”  
Indeed, as Oliver Crisp points out it is an open question—or at least, in his 
words, “difficult to say”—“precisely what analytic philosophy is.” He goes on to give 
a characterization which, he notes, can be misleading without qualification, but which 
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is nonetheless indicative of some contemporary analytic approaches. The method, he 
writes, is that: 
 
problems are broken down into their constituent parts, analyzed, and 
then reformed in an argument that attempts to make sense of the 
original problem. Here the analytic philosopher is rather like a 
mechanic who decides to strip an engine down in order to understand 
why it is making a peculiar rattling sound. He analyses the parts of the 
engine, cleans them up, and then reassembles the machine having 
satisfied himself that he has addressed the problem so that the engine 
will work properly once reformed. (Crisp 2009, 36) 
 
One reason the phenomenologically inclined theologian might find such a 
method suspect – and contest that theology should be done only in the analytic mode 
– is that theological questions, unlike engines, affect the mechanic subjectively. This 
example raises questions of objectivity and subjectivity, and with them the potential 
for mutual misunderstanding, because these terms have different meanings in each 
tradition.  
 From the phenomenological perspective, to consider a theological “problem,” 
such as Christology or atonement, solely in terms of “breaking it down,” and to find 
its “solution” in a successful reconstruction which follows the rules of inference – may 
be to ignore the lived dimension of soteriology. The “subjectivity” of theological truth, 
on this phenomenological view of the lived experience of salvation, is not (just?) a 
matter of propositional relations but of personal transformation. The German 
phenomenologist Edmund Husserl criticized what he called “objective philosophy” 
for misunderstanding the world and the knowing subject’s place in it because, as 
Dermot Moran glosses it, “One cannot subtract the knowing subject from the process 
of knowledge, and treat the desiccated product as if it were the real world” (2013, 92–
3). Neither can the phenomenological theologian subtract the subject’s experience of 
salvation from the process of knowing God, as if “objective” knowledge of God was 
the whole truth. 
The danger of misrepresenting theological truth is treated in Eleonore Stump’s 
Wandering in Darkness, where she argues that the analytic approach to knowledge of 
God is valuable but incomplete (2010, 47). On Stump’s view, there are kinds of 
knowledge that are irreducible to “knowledge that,” which leads her to outline two 
typologies: Dominican and Franciscan.  
 
Metaphysics and theology, ethics and morality, can be understood and 
explained best, on Dominican views (typologically understood), by 
careful reasoning and argumentation […] The ultimate foundation of 
reality for [the Franciscan] (typologically understood) is […] personal, 
and for that reason knowledge of it will be a knowledge of persons. 
(2010, 46) 
 
She therefore proposes narrative as a means of accessing “knowledge of 
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in cases where necessary and sufficient conditions for something are 
hard to find or in the nature of things not available (for example, 
because what we are attempting to define is irreducibly vague), then 
Franciscan categorization or typology may in fact be more accurate, or 
at least more true to the phenomena, than Dominican categorization. A 
pretension to precision where none is available can also produce a 
clumsy, axe-hewn categorization, which misrepresents the thing it 
seeks to describe.’ (2010, 47) 
 
Descriptive phenomenology of the kind Sartre advocated also aims to exhibit 
the “Franciscan” virtue of being “true to the phenomena” it describes. This is 
significant for our consideration because a person of faith may find the divine 
attribute of benevolence, analytically approached, to be different enough from his or 
her experience of divine love to be counted a distinct (or even unrecognizable) 
phenomenon. I will say more about this in a moment, but before doing so it is worth 
mentioning that the “argumentocentric” conception of philosophy, as Simon 
Glendinning (2007, 23) calls it, has been criticized from other quarters of the analytic 
tradition for overemphasizing the ratiocinative and underestimating the place of the 
imagination in our thinking lives. With respect to moral philosophy, Cora Diamond 
has argued that unless we “bring imagination to bear on observation,” or at least 
recognize that we have done so, the development of our arguments will prove “quite 
useless” (1996, 305, 306). To complement Stump’s “narrative” approach, therefore, 
in what follows, I will outline some contributions that can be made by Sartrean 
phenomenology. 
 
Phenomenology and its discontents 
 
Phenomenology has been regarded with some scepticism in analytic circles, 
and although recent work in cognitive phenomenology (e.g. Tim Bayne 2011) has 
begun to redress this reputation I would like to begin with Daniel Dennett’s objection 
to phenomenology in Consciousness Explained (1991). This work is not recent, but 
Dennett’s text raises pertinent questions about knowledge and belief, as well as 
subjectivity and objectivity. Before turning to the objection, however, it is necessary 
to make three points of clarification. 
First, phenomenology is not an alternative epistemology. It is not interested in 
“gaining propositional knowledge” or “rational proof,” but rather concerns lived 
commitment and “re-visioning” the world. For phenomenology, “clarity” in writing is 
not conceived as “the upshot of becoming convinced by an argument for an 
unambiguous statement or thesis,” as Simon Glendinning writes, “but a matter of 
having come reflectively to terms with something pre-reflectively ‘before one’s eyes’” 
(2007, 23). To borrow Stanley Cavell’s idiom, it is a matter not of knowledge but 
acknowledgement (1976, 238–66). 
Second, it is important to take care in approaching phenomenological 
language: Heidegger’s etymological approach to defining “phenomenology” gives us 
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“talk or discourse” about “that which shows itself” (1962, 34) but this – and even more 
so Sartre’s use of “appearance” in place of “phenomenon” – can be misleading to 
philosophers for whom the term “phenomenology” is already connoted with a 
distinction between appearance and reality.  Sartre’s use of “appearance” in place of 
“phenomenon” may lead them to suppose that phenomenology is about how things 
seem rather than how they are.  
Finally, in French phenomenological terms, “to appear” is to appear to 
someone, so phenomenology is often also described as a study of “experience.” But 
this term, too, may be laden with philosophical connotations that distort the 
phenomenologists’ intended meaning. Unlike the “experience” of empiricism, the 
“experience” of phenomenology is not the starting point of knowledge; instead, it is 
the object of phenomenological investigation. In this parlance, “experience” is not a 
pluralizable term; its meaning is better approximated in phrases like “the wisdom of 
experience.”  
 
Dennett  
 
These confusions are evident in Consciousness Explained, where Dennett writes that 
“Philosophers and psychologists often use the term phenomenology as an umbrella 
term to cover all the items — the fauna and flora, you might say — that inhabit our 
conscious experience: thoughts, smells, itches, pains, imagined purple cows, hunches, 
and all the rest (1991, 44).” But, on his account, “Phenomenology has failed to find a 
single, settled method that everyone could agree upon. So while there are zoologists, 
there really are no phenomenologists: [which is to say there are no] uncontroversial 
experts on the nature of the things that swim in the stream of consciousness (1991, 
44).” The problem, we read some pages later, is that phenomenologists make what 
Dennett calls “the first-person plural presumption (1991, 67).” If all the 
phenomenologist is talking about is the private contents of her own mind, Dennett 
objects, surely such a presumption is more than presumptuous – it is untestable and 
of limited (if any) value to others. It is a Trojan horse, we might say, smuggling in 
‘subjective’ experience and calling it philosophy. Indeed, this perception may not be 
helped by the first paragraph of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on 
phenomenology, which states that “Phenomenology studies conscious experience as 
experienced from the subjective or first person point of view (Smith 2013).” 
But phenomenological reflection is not mere introspection. When a 
phenomenologist describes her experience – like the absence of an awaited friend, or 
the touch of a lover – she is describing not the contents of her own mind but the world. 
Her reader is supposed to recognize something in the description which provokes a 
relation to his own experience. Far from being untestable, as Katherine Morris writes, 
“we might say that our recognition is a criterion of correctness for a phenomenological 
description (2008, 29).”  
It is not quite as simple as that, however. A complication arises because, to 
borrow Morris’s words again, “the failure to recognize the description may be due to 
intellectual prejudices (2008, 29).” We will turn to discuss these in greater depth in 
the next section of the paper, but first let us return to Dennett and the language of 
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appearing. Dennett gives an example in which anthropologists discover a hitherto-
unknown tribe that believes in a forest-god called Feenoman. Upon discovery, 
Dennett outlines three possible approaches anthropologists may take toward the 
study of this tribe. (1) [the Feenomanists] go native, and “convert to the native 
religion and believe wholeheartedly in the real existence and good works of 
Feenoman”; (2) [the Feenomanologists] take an agnostic approach to “decide to study 
and systematize as best they can the religion of these people. They set down 
descriptions of Feenoman given by native informants. They look for agreement, but 
don't always find it […]. Gradually a logical construct emerges: Feenoman the forest 
god, complete with a list of traits and habits and a biography (1991, 82–3)”—here we 
might find something like “benevolence,” which may or may not correspond well to 
the Feenomanists’ experience of divine love; (3) “remain neutral,” taking into account 
the reports of groups (1) and (2) and attempting to find out whether the causes of the 
Feenomanists’ beliefs are what they think they are (1991, 84). 
On Dennett’s analogy, the phenomenologists, like the Feenomanologists, are 
simply cataloguing our beliefs about ourselves and our “life-world,” to use 
Wittgenstein’s term. But should the phenomenologist take those beliefs to be true—
i.e. assume that the cause of a belief is sufficiently like what we take their cause to 
be—then they are open to refutation by the third group, the “neutrals.” Since Sartre 
does not “bracket off” existence (i.e. he takes the second approach above, cataloguing 
his beliefs about the world as if they are true), he seems to make this very assumption. 
But Sartrean phenomenology rejects the equation of “objectivity” with “remaining 
neutral.” And insofar as Dennett is representative of the analytic tradition in this 
respect, I take this to be problematic.  
Katherine Morris offers what I take to be a convincing defence of early 
Sartrean phenomenology in this respect. First, she turns her attention to Dennett’s 
language, which reflects an antiquated notion of anthropology. In particular, his use 
of the word “belief” resembles that of J.G. Frazer (1922) and W.H.R. Rivers (1924), 
both well known in the anthropology of religion for seeing beliefs as opinions (which 
we might as well read “unjustified opinions”). But the word “belief,” in anthropology 
as in philosophy, is not straightforward. More recent anthropologists and have noted 
the etymological roots of the word “belief”; it is related to “beloved” and the archaic 
”lief.” In its older use, as W. C. Smith notes, 
 
The affirmation “I believe in God” used to mean: “Given the reality of 
God as a fact of the universe, I hereby pledge to him my heart and 
soul…” Today, the statement may be taken by some as meaning: “Given 
the uncertainty as to whether there be a God or not … I announce that 
my opinion is “yes”. (W.C. Smith, quoted in Morris 2008, 37) 
 
The point Morris makes is that for Dennett and his imaginary Feenomanologists, 
beliefs are opinions—which is to say, intellectual commitments to propositions—not 
commitments to ways of life. Analysis can help us understand such intellectual 
commitments, but—and we will return to this—as Pascal wrote in the Pensées, ‘The 
knowledge of God is very far from the love of him” (L77/B280). 
Morris’s third objection to Dennett is that he takes the Feenomanists beliefs to 
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be proto-scientific: like Frazer before him, Dennett would likely attribute them to 
primitive error. This makes Wittgenstein’s comments on Frazer applicable to 
Dennett, too: both present “primitive” practices as, Wittgenstein says, “so to speak, 
pieces of stupidity” (1979, 61). In anthropology today, however, the “proto-scientific” 
approach to analysis of human practices is “largely discounted” (Good 1994, 22). As 
Morris writes,  
 
The old-style anthropologists who employed the term “belief” in 
connection with “primitive” tribes tended to use the word “knowledge” 
in reference to their own assented-to propositions, thereby suggesting 
that their own beliefs are true whereas those of the culture they are 
studying are false. (2008, 38) 
 
This makes Dennett’s label for the third group—and his own method—rather 
disingenuous. For although he claims to be “neutral,” clearly his view of what it takes 
to falsify the Feenomanists beliefs is already determined. For Dennett, like Frazer-
style anthropologists, science is the “arbiter between knowledge and belief” (Good 
1994, 22). This scientism, in Morris’s words, “embodies a veritable bouquet of 
intellectual prejudices” (2008, 39). 
 A final objection to Dennett, which brings us back to Oliver Crisp’s mechanic 
example, is that there is a significant disanalogy between Dennett’s anthropologists 
and phenomenologists. The Feenomanologists are studying other subjects—they 
observe the tribe from a third-person point of view. But the “tribe” observed by 
phenomenology is us—conscious humans in the world, on which it is not possible to 
take a truly “external” point of view. As Sartre wrote in the 1930s, of the emerging 
empirical science of psychology, such an approach fails to recognize the proximity of 
the investigator to the thing investigated (2012, 122). This point was further 
developed by Merleau-Ponty, who wrote that “The most important lesson which the 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (1962, xiv). No 
philosophy is done perspective-free, without presuppositions, and fruit can come of 
attending to our starting points. 
All philosophy is subjective, on a phenomenological construal of the term, 
because all philosophy is done by situated subjects. But this is not to say that it is 
“subjective” in the first-person-presumptuous sense: it is not a matter of knowing the 
private contents of a mind. To return to the idea of intellectual prejudices, on Sartre’s 
view, philosophy’s prejudice for knowing over living has led to the impoverishment 
of experience. In particular, he accused his contemporaries of understanding “little 
besides epistemology” (1970, 5). In a passage which exhibits what Peter Caws calls 
“that peculiar taste for philosophical melodrama which has so alienated sceptical 
Anglo-Saxons from their excitable Continental colleagues” (Caws 1979, 66), Sartre 
writes that: “The description of knowledge is too often alimentary. There still remains 
too much of prélogisme
 
in epistemological philosophy, and we are not yet rid of that 
primitive illusion (which we must account for later) according to which to know is to 
eat – that is, to ingest the known object, to fill oneself with it (ErfiiIIung), and to digest 
it (‘assimilation’)” (2003, 210). 
On the contrary, Sartre says, “our consciousness of things is by no means 
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limited to knowledge of them. Knowledge … is only one of the possible forms of my 
consciousness ‘of’ this tree; I can also love it, fear it, hate it” (1970, 5; emphasis added). 
The prejudice for knowing excludes or devalues other forms of consciousness—
particularly the “lived experience” of the world. Contemporary phenomenologists 
might want to extend this list of lived experience to other “structures of 
consciousness” including: perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, 
desire, and volition, bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including 
linguistic activity (Smith 2013). 
For those in the grip of this prejudice for knowing things (neutrally), 
“knowledge” is propositional; it is connected to probability and evidence or 
validation/invalidation (see Sartre 2003, 267–8): in other words, it is connected to 
inference. But proofs of this order do not convince. Drawing on Bergson, Sartre seems 
to distinguish between analysis as the method of the faculty of the intellect and 
intuition as the method of the faculty of intuition. He writes that: 
 
There is only intuitive knowledge. Deduction and discursive argument, 
incorrectly called examples of knowing, are only instruments which 
lead to intuition. When intuition is reached, methods utilized to attain 
it are effaced before it; in cases where it is not attained, reason and 
argument remain as indicating signs which point toward an intuition 
beyond reach; finally if it has been attained but is not a present mode 
of my consciousness, the precepts which I use remain as the results of 
operations formerly effected. (Sartre 2003, 195) 
 
What Sartre calls “the illusion of the primacy of knowledge” (Sartre 2003, 10, 12) 
leads philosophers to consider existential relationships as epistemological ones. For 
a person of faith, if the phrase “I believe in God” expresses not just propositional 
assent but a lived experience of commitment, then in order to understand that faith a 
propositional approach will not be adequate. To repeat Pascal: “The knowledge of 
God is very far from the love of him” (L77/B280). A phenomenology of faith might 
strive, therefore, as Glendinning writes of phenomenology in general, “not for new 
knowledge but your acknowledgement. […] [W]hat characterizes an investigation in 
phenomenology is a work of convincing words which, in an age dominated by science, 
aims to cultivate and develop your capacity faithfully to retrieve (for) yourself (as 
from the inside) a radically re-vis(ion)ed understanding of yourself and your place in 
the world and with others” (2007, 27). 
This personal transformation – the lived experience of the truth of faith – takes 
into account the situatedness of our convictions and the importance of our conduct in 
relation to them. After undergoing it, the faithful person should not be, like the 
philosophers of Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, content to “interpret the world 
in various ways”; rather, they should realize that they, too, are responsible for what 
it is – and for changing it. 
As Merold Westphal writes,  
 
By describing the goal of reflection as relearning to see the world, 
existential phenomenology reminds the theologian that, while ‘seeing 
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is believing’, according to a familiar adage, believing is not necessarily 
seeing. I can sincerely believe, for example, that the lives of the 
homeless poor of New York and Calcutta and the shanty-town poor of 
Africa and Latin America are of equal value to the lives of highly 
educated, highly affluent suburban Americans without seeing the 
former and myself in these terms. I can sincerely believe that my sins 
are forgiven by the grace of God and that justification is a gift and not a 
form of wages and still see myself as carrying a load of guilt that I must 
work off with pious practices. (2009, 271-272) 
 
Westphal goes on to summarize his point concisely: “having my doxastic house 
in order is not the ultimate goal of theological discourse. It is rather to bring my 
seeings (and thereby feelings and actions, since these arise more from my seeings than 
from my believings) into conformity with my best judgments about what is true” (2009, 
272).  
 
 
Conclusion: The goal(s) of theological discourse? 
 
Analysis and inference can help us make judgments about what is true. But whether 
the philosophical tool is fit for the theological purpose depends on the task at hand. 
To whom do we speak? For what end? If a goal of theology is to help us know truths 
about God, and some of those truths are not propositional, then the analytic method 
alone is insufficient. And if a goal of theology is to edify those who assent to its 
propositional truths, then the analytic method needs a handmaid that pays greater 
attention to the lived experience of faith. 
Before coming to a close, it is worth emphasizing that the ‘convincingness 
deficit’ is not exclusive to the philosophy of religion. To cite Cora Diamond again: 
 
When we engage in philosophical discussion about a subject such as 
abortion, or the moral status of animals, whom should we think of 
ourselves as trying to convince? For if we proceed by giving arguments, 
we presumably do not expect to be able to convince anyone who is 
incapable of following our arguments, or who is too prejudiced to 
consider them. And if we are talking about convincing human beings, 
surely it is a fact about many of them that one certain way of not 
convincing them is to try arguing the case. … No one who urges another 
philosopher to give arguments thinks of arguments as capable of 
convincing everybody. […] argument is simply one way people 
approach moral questions, and there are other ways of trying to 
convince someone of one’s view of animals or foetuses or slaves or 
children or whatever it may be. (1996, 292) 
 
Bernard Williams argued, with respect to ethics, that there are cases where all 
analysis can do is assist the self-understanding of those whose reasoning already has 
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guidance from elsewhere. Williams says that an expansion of the emotions is required 
to see things differently; Sartre would likely argue that it is a matter of imagination.  
The phenomenological approach, like the analytic one, may come with its own 
deficit if deployed in the wrong circumstances. But its goal is not to convince; rather, 
it is to edify, to help us re-vision the world. William James wrote of “live” and “dead” 
options that “deadness and liveness […] are measured by [a thinker’s] willingness to 
act” (James 1912, section I). A phenomenological approach to faith seeks an 
understanding that is not only inferentially above reproach, but lived in integrity. It 
encourages us to attend to those forms of consciousness “of” God which are 
irreducible to “knowledge that,” and to make new options “live.” 
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